In this dissertation, I examine Socrates' defense of justice in Plato's Republic. I contend that recognizing the problematic character of Socrates' defense of justice in the Republic is a key to understanding his teaching regarding justice. In response to the request made by Glaucon and Adeimantus at the beginning of Book Two, Socrates tries to show, in the bulk of the Republic, that justice is intrinsically good and that it is better than injustice. In doing so, he relies especially on (...) the definition of the justice of the individual that he provides at the end of Book Four, i.e., allowing each of the parts of the soul to mind its own business. But this definition is paradoxical and appears to have little link with justice as ordinarily understood. It contrasts with the more commonsensical definitions of justice offered in Book One, e.g., that justice is giving to each what is owed and telling the truth. In Book Five through Book Ten, Socrates continues his defense of justice by equating the just man and the philosopher--indeed, by making clear that the philosopher is just more or less in the sense outlined in Book Four. But Socrates implicitly points to the problematic character of the equation of the just man and the philosopher by revealing, among other things, that the philosophers must be compelled to rule in the best regime even though it would be a matter of justice for them to rule willingly. I attempt to comprehend why Socrates provides such a problematic defense of the justice of the individual in the Republic. So too, I explore Socrates' equally problematic defense of the justice of the city. In particular, I consider the possibility and goodness of Socrates' three paradoxical proposals aimed at bringing about the greatest justice attainable within a city--namely, the community of women and children, the equality of the sexes, and the philosopher-kings. (shrink)

Leon Craig begins his study of the Republic by wondering whether his study is "truly novel". By the end of his study, Craig assures us that his interpretation of the Republic "is a novel one". The interpretive method by which he arrives at this novel interpretation is, however, he admits, not so novel. This method--drawn from the work of Leo Strauss--takes into special account the dramatic form of the Platonic dialogue, the requirements of esoteric writing, and "the law of logographic (...) necessity". However, it is clear from even a cursory reading of Craig's book that the way in which he applies, and even understands, this method is more "idiosyncratic" than he acknowledges. (shrink)

Crispin Wright has recently introduced a non-evidential notion of warrant – entitlement of cognitive project – as a promising response to certain sceptical arguments, which have been subject to extensive discussion within mainstream epistemology. The central idea is that, for a given class of cognitive projects, there are certain basic propositions – entitlements – which one is warranted in trusting provided there is no sufficient reason to think them false. (See Wrigh [2].) The aim of this paper is to provide (...) an account of the notion of entitlement of cognitive project and briefly discuss the question whether there is any work for the notion of entitlement to do within the philosophy of mathematics. Bearing in mind its applications in mainstream epistemology, it will be suggested that the notion can be used to formulate a response to certain kinds of scepticism which call into question the warrantability of (acceptances of) propositions that appear integral to mathematical theorizing in a given mathematical theory T – in particular, that T is consistent and that T ’s background logic is sound. (shrink)

Business ethics has been described as a prime academic growth industry. This paper reports the findings of a survey aimed at establishing the status of ethics in the curricula of Canadian Schools of Management and Administrative Studies. It was found that twenty-three of the forty-two responding schools offer courses in business ethics and that they offer a total of twenty-five ethics courses, twenty of which are offered as electives. Forty-two percent of the schools not offering a course in business ethics (...) plan to offer such a course by 1989. This means that by 1989 seventy-four percent of the responding schools should have a business ethics component in their curricula. (shrink)

In this book, Koo discusses political change in the view of Confucian thought. This study focuses on the Book of Change, which is one of the nine basic books of Confucius School; it has dominated oriental thought in this field for more than three thousand years. The aim of this study is to analyze and arrange its theory of change, and to apply it to political reality. Therefore, this book analyzes and summarizes the theories of change and applies those theories (...) to political change. From that process, the theories of political changes are developed. Their usefulness is tested in the real world and compared to the existing theories of political change. The result is to develop and present a new theory of political change. (shrink)

Resumen En este trabajo se presentan algunos resultados acerca del uso del usted de una investigación sobre la selección pronominal llevada a cabo en tres municipios del departamento colombiano de Antioquia: 1) La ciudad de Medellín, que se considera zona urbana; 2) Carmen de Viboral, que se comprende como una zona semi rural y 3) Andes, que se entiende como una zona rural. Más concretamente, se muestra, por un lado, en cuál de las tres zonas se emplearía con más frecuencia (...) el usted y, por el otro, en qué zona se observa más notablemente la dependencia entre la selección del usted y la edad del interlocutor. La población estudiada está constituida por informantes de edades entre los 13 y los 34 años. La variable social para este artículo es el lugar de la vivienda de los informantes, es decir, zona urbana, semi rural o rural lo cual se ha correlacionado con la edad de los informantes. Para llevar a cabo esta investigación se aplicó un cuestionario, donde aparecen distintos tipos interaccionales, a los informantes de las zonas mencionadas, obteniéndose un total de 1.490 informantes. Tres técnicas estadísticas fueron aplicadas a estos datos: 1) tamaño de muestra óptimo para distribuciones multinomiales; 2) análisis de varianza con un solo factor ; 3) prueba de hipótesis para proporciones. La estadística muestra que, por un lado, en la gran mayoría de relaciones interpersonales, en Andes se usa más el usted que en Carmen de Viboral y, asimismo, en este último municipio se emplea más el usted que en Medellín; por otro lado, en Medellín, en comparación con Carmen de Viboral o Andes, se usa más el usted con interlocutores de mayor edad que con los de la misma o menor edad. En otras palabras, en las zonas rurales se usa mucho más el usted que en la zona urbana, independientemente de la edad de los interlocutores, como marca de costumbres más conservadoras. (shrink)

The last decade has witnessed renewed attempts to regulate the conduct of transnational corporations. One way to do this is via global ethics codes. This paper examines seven such codes (the Sullivan Principles, UN Center for Transnational Corporations’ Draft Code, OECD Guidelines, ILO's Tripartite Declaration, the Caux Round Table Principles for Business, Global Compact, and the United Nations Norms) to determine their coverage of human rights and concludes that if these initiatives succeed, particularly the more recent codes, transnational corporations may (...) emerge as a major force in promoting human rights globally. (shrink)

Neuroeconomics has the potential to fundamentally change the way economics is done. This article identifies the ways in which this will occur, pitfalls of this approach, and areas where progress has already been made. The value of neuroeconomics studies for social policy lies in the quality, replicability, and relevance of the research produced. While most economists will not contribute to the neuroeconomics literature, we contend that most economists should be reading these studies.

The end of the cold war has elevated environmental issues to the highest level of concern for humanity while creating a world order dominated by the United States of America and other Western nations. This new power structure may likely lead to increased business activity in many parts of the world, as nations formerly preoccupied with the cold war turn their attention to economic development. This paper examines the linkages among ethics, economic development and protection and restoration of the environment (...) in The New World Order. (shrink)

The annual production of hazardous wastes which was less than 10 million metric tonnes in the 1940s is now in excess of 320 million metric tonnes. These wastes are, in the main, by-products of industrial processes that have contributed significantly to the economic development of many countries which, in turn, has led to lifestyles that also generate hazardous wastes. The phenomenal increase in the generation of hazardous wastes coupled with various barriers to local disposal has led to the thriving international (...) trade in these environmentally hazardous substances. This paper examines the nature of the international trade in hazardous wastes and the ethical issues associated with such business activity. (shrink)

Recent figures reported by KPMG confirm the growing prevalence of corporate codes of ethics globally. Svensson et al. (Bus Ethics 18:389–407, 2009 ) in surveys of the largest corporations in Australia, Canada, and Sweden found a similar trend. The increased prevalence of corporate codes of ethics has been accompanied by heightened research interest in various aspects of these documents, e.g., the contents and focus of the codes. However, there is a paucity of research examining the effectiveness of these documents and (...) the organizational infrastructure that accompany them. This study, based on a survey of Canada’s largest corporations, sought to empirically assess the determinants of the effectiveness of corporate codes of ethics by regressing managers’ perceptions of code effectiveness against various elements of ethics programs. It was found that, in a statistically significant model, eighteen independent variables explain 58.5% of the variance in the perceived effectiveness of corporate codes of ethics. (shrink)

Time distortion in individuals with social anxiety has been defined as the seemingly slower passage of time in social situations and is related to both arousal and valence. Consequently, adaptive behavior is disrupted and interpersonal situations avoided. We explored the effects of valence and arousal on time distortion in individuals with social anxiety. Participants were assigned to two groups, High Anxiety (HA) and Low Anxiety (LA), presented with four types of facial expression stimuli (positive-high arousal, positive-low arousal, negative-high arousal, and (...) negative-low arousal), and asked to estimate the duration of stimulus presentation. Results indicated that, relative to other stimuli, the HA and LA groups perceived longer presentation for high-arousal negative and low-arousal positive stimuli, respectively. These findings suggest that anxious individuals’ time distortion was more severe in situations that evoked high arousal and involved negative emotion. (shrink)

The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention in the truth literature and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible one. While diverging in their specific philosophical commitments, adherents of these historically prominent views agree in at least one fundamental respect. They are all alethic monists. They all endorse the thesis that there is only one property (...) in virtue of which propositions can be true, and so, in this sense, take truth to be one. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea. There are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. The literature on truth pluralism has been growing steadily for the past twenty years. This volume, however, is the first of its kind—the first collection of papers focused specifically on pluralism about truth. Part I is dedicated to the development, investigation, and critical discussion of different forms of pluralism. An additional reason to look at truth pluralism with interest is the significant connections it bears to other debates in the truth literature—the debates concerning traditional theories of truth and the deflationism/inflationism divide being cases in hand. Parts II and III of the volume connect truth pluralism to these two debates. (shrink)

Alethic pluralism is the view that the nature of truth is not uniform across domains. There are several ways of bang true $(T_1 ...\,T_n )$ A simple argument, the 'instability challenge', purports to show that this view is inherently unstable. One can simply say that something is uniformly true if and only if it is T₁ or ... or $\,T_n $ . Being uniformly true is a single truth property that applies across the board, and so the nature of truth (...) is uniform across domains, contra pluralism. I defend pluralism against the instability challenge. I show that the challenge bifurcates: one Challenge is formulated in terms of predicates, and the other is formulated in terms of properties. Vie pluralist has the resources to defuse both of these. The sparse/abundant property distinction and considerations of explanatory asymmetry play a crucial role in my argument. (shrink)

Do perceptual states necessarily constitute evidence epistemically supporting corresponding perceptual beliefs? Susanna Schellenberg thinks so. She argues that perceptual states, veridical or not, necessarily provide (or constitute) a kind of evidence (for the existence of the truth-maker) supporting corresponding perceptual beliefs. She uses “phenomenal evidence” as a label for this kind of evidence and calls her argument “The Phenomenal Evidence Argument.” Having introduced her project, we offer a reconstruction of Schellenberg’s argument. A key premise has it that, necessarily, for items (...) with a function, fulfillment of the function (the good case) is explanatorily and metaphysically prior to function failure (the bad case). We suggest that the etiological theory of functions renders this key premise plausible. However, Schellenberg rejects the etiological theory of functions and likewise the idea that the epistemic or warranting force of perceptual states is grounded in their being reliably linked to veridical perception. But then what supports the key premise? Schellenberg argues that accurate perception is a part of the nature of perceptual capacities because the nature of perceptual capacities is explained in terms of their function, and their function is to represent accurately. We suggest that Schellenberg is committed to an understanding of priority which doesn’t require any actual good cases—just possible ones. This reading, we argue, is too weak to support the key premise. Given Schellenberg’s commitments, it is not necessarily the case that perceptual states are evidence for a corresponding perceptual belief. Before concluding we discuss an overgeneralization objection. (shrink)

John Rawls presents a liberal conception of international justice in his book The Law of Peoples, and this liberal conception of international justice has inspired a variety of responses from various perspectives. However, it seems that most such responses come from western perspectives, and that there is hence a corresponding paucity of seriously challenging responses based on non-western traditions. This paper aims to analyze Rawls’s liberal conception of international justice in view of the concept of natural justice expressed within the (...) Book of Change in order to illuminate the limitations and problems of Rawls’s conception in practice as well as in theory. Rawls employs the idea of political liberalism to construct a liberal conception of international justice that can be applied to a society of societies. Rawls addresses the eight principles for justice among free and democratic peoples, which have been historically accepted by western peoples. He admits that these principles are incomplete. There is no theoretical order among the eight principles equivalent to the lexical order of the two principles of justice in A Theory of Justice. There are no guidelines or basic principles for resolving the problem of priority that arises when the principles are themselves in conflict with one another. This situation may generate competing conceptions of justice within the society of peoples. Rawls mentions natural justice in his explanation for the extension of liberal political principles to decent hierarchical peoples. He takes as an example of natural justice the rule of formal equality that “similar cases be treated similarly.” He does not develop any further the idea of natural justice for his theory of international justice, which could potentially span the gap between his ideal theory and non-ideal theory, or enhance the reasonableness of his international justice, especially for non-liberal peoples. The Book of Change expresses the idea of natural justice that underlies the principle of Yin-Yang, which differs fundamentally from the liberal contract paradigm. The paper will argue that the idea of natural justice should be seriously considered for justice among peoples since it can provide the bedrock for criticizing non-public reason as well as public reason. (shrink)

Public consumption of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies has been rarely investigated from the perspective of data surveillance and security. We show that the technology acceptance model, when properly modified with security and surveillance fears about AI, builds an insight on how individuals begin to use, accept, or evaluate AI and its automated decisions. We conducted two studies, and found positive roles of perceived ease of use (PEOU) and perceived usefulness (PU). AI security concern, however, negatively affected PEOU and PU, resulting (...) in less acceptance of AI—(1) use, (2) preference, and (3) participation. AI surveillance concern also had negative effects on the credibility of AI and its recommendations. We integrated extant literature on socio-demographic differences, providing an insight on how AI acceptance is based on one’s rationality regarding (1) technological risks (security/surveillance) and (2) benefits (PEOU/PU) as well as other contextual factors of socio-demographics. (shrink)

Our main aim in this paper is to contribute towards a better understanding of the epistemology of absence-based inferences. Many absence-based inferences are classified as fallacies. There are exceptions, however. We investigate what features make absence-based inferences epistemically good or reliable. In Section 2 we present Sanford Goldberg’s account of the reliability of absence-based inference, introducing the central notion of epistemic coverage. In Section 3 we approach the idea of epistemic coverage through a comparison of alethic and evidential principles. The (...) Equivalence Schema–a well-known alethic principle–says that it is true that $p$ if and only if $p$ . We take epistemic coverage to underwrite a suitably qualified evidential analogue of the Equivalence Schema: for a high proportion of values of $p$ , subject $S$ has evidence that $p$ due to her reliance on source $S^{*}$ if and only if $p$ . We show how this evidential version of the Equivalence Schema suffices for the reliability of certain absence-based inferences. Section 4 is dedicated to exploring consequences of the Evidential Equivalence Schema. The slogan ‘absence of evidence is evidence of absence’ has received a lot of bad press. More elaborately, what has received a lot of bad press is something like the following idea: absence of evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $p$ is evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $\sim p$ . A striking consequence of the Evidential Equivalence Schema is that absence of evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in p is evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $\sim p$ . We establish this claim in Section 4 and show how this supports the reliability of an additional type of absence-based inference. Section 4 immediately raises the following question: how can we make philosophically good sense of the idea that absence of evidence is evidence of absence? We address this question in Section 5. Section 6 contains some summary remarks. (shrink)

Brain-computer interface (BCI) systems were developed so that people can control computers or machines through their brain activity without moving their limbs. The P300 speller is one of the BCI applications used most commonly, as is very simple and reliable and can achieve satisfactory performance. However, like other BCIs, the P300 speller still has room for improvements in terms of its practical use, for example, selecting the best compromise between spelling accuracy and information transfer rate (ITR; speed) so that the (...) P300 speller can maintain high accuracy while increasing spelling speed. Therefore, seeking correlates of, and predicting, the P300 speller’s performance is necessary to understand and improve the technique. In this work, we investigated the correlations between rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task features and the P300 speller’s performance. Fifty-five subjects participated in the RSVP and conventional matrix P300 speller tasks and RSVP behavioral and electroencephalography (EEG) features were compared in the P300’s speller performance. We found that several of the RSVP’s event-related potential (ERP) and behavioral features were correlated with the P300 speller’s offline binary classification accuracy. Using these features, we propose a simple multi-feature performance predictor ( r = 0.53, p = 0.0001) that outperforms any single feature performance predictor, including that of the conventional RSVP T1% predictor ( r = 0.28, p = 0.06). This result demonstrates that selective multi-features can predict BCI performance better than a single feature alone. (shrink)

Virtual reality is a rapidly developing technology that simulates the real world. However, for some cybersickness-susceptible people, VR still has an unanswered problem—cybersickness—which becomes the main obstacle for users and content makers. Sensory conflict theory is a widely accepted theory for cybersickness. It proposes that conflict between afferent signals and internal models can cause cybersickness. This study analyzes the brain states that determine cybersickness occurrence and related uncomfortable feelings. Furthermore, we use the electroencephalogram microstates and functional connectivity approach based on (...) the sensory conflict theory. The microstate approach is a time–space analysis method that allows signals to be divided into several temporarily stable states, simultaneously allowing for the exploration of short- and long-range signals. These temporal dynamics can show the disturbances in mental processes associated with neurological and psychiatric conditions of cybersickness. Furthermore, the functional connectivity approach gives us in-depth insight and relationships between the sources related to cybersickness. We recruited 40 males, and they watched a VR video on a curved computer monitor for 10 min to experience cybersickness. We recorded the 5-min resting state EEG and 10-min EEG while watching the VR video. Then, we performed a microstate analysis, focusing on two temporal parameters: mean duration and global explained variance. Finally, we obtained the functional connectivity data using eLoreta and lagged phase synchronization. We discovered five sets of microstates, including four widely reported canonical microstates, during baseline and task conditions. The average duration increased in microstates A and B, which is related to the visual and auditory networks. The GEV and duration decreased in microstate C, whereas those in microstate D increased. Microstate C is related to the default mode network and D to the attention network. The temporal dynamics of the microstate parameters are from cybersickness disturbing the sensory, DMN, and attention networks. In the functional connectivity part, the LPS between the left and right parietal operculum significantly decreased compared with the baseline condition. Furthermore, the connectivity between the right OP and V5 significantly decreased. These results also support the disturbance of the sensory network because a conflict between the visual and vestibular system causes cybersickness. Changes in the microstates and functional connectivity support the sensory conflict theory. These results may provide additional information in understanding brain dynamics during cybersickness. (shrink)

This paper examines the Fair Trade practices of Dure, a Korean consumer cooperative, through the extended cooperative enterprise citizenship framework. Extended cooperative citizenship means that cooperatives should replace citizenship and fill the gaps in the weakening public service sector. As dual-purpose business organizations, cooperatives have already played essential roles as extended corporate citizens. However, previous literature regarding CSR or cooperatives has not sufficiently explored the social responsibility of cooperatives. Furthermore, corporate citizenship is generally regarded as a singular and static concept. (...) Therefore, this paper analyses Dure’s Fair Trade practices through the newly developed framework. Significantly, this article clarifies how Dure collaborates with key stakeholders and upholds their civil, political, and social rights through Fair Trade. This paper also explains how cooperative enterprise citizenship has changed as Fair Trade practices have shifted. Two implications of this research are revealed. First, the paper develops a new analytical model to explain the dynamics of corporate citizenship and Fair Trade practices. Second, the research provides details about the social responsibility of Korean consumer cooperatives based on Fair Trade that will have practical applications for practitioners in the business sector. (shrink)

In his book Autonomous Knowledge J. Adam Carter argues that the possibility of radical cognitive enhancement shows the need for epistemology to be significantly updated. Reflection on the possibility of such enhancement shows that doxastic autonomy matters. If a belief fails to be autonomous, it cannot qualify as knowledge. Sects. 1-3 of this paper introduce the key components of Carter's autonomy framework and his considerations on the value of knowledge (including his proposed solution to the value problem, i.e. the challenge (...) of accounting for why knowledge has greater value than any of its proper parts). Sects. 4-7 offer a critical appraisal of Carter's framework. We are not convinced that Carter has succeeded in showing that there is an autonomous belief condition on knowledge. In this paper, however, we shall not engage with this issue. Instead, for the sake of our critical discussion, we shall assume that autonomous belief is a condition on knowledge and engage Carter on a cluster of issues concerning axiology. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper discusses the normativity of truth and logic. The paper has three objectives. First, I argue that logic is normative for thought in the sense of underwriting instrumental rationality. Logic is a good instrument for achieving truth, the goal of cognition. In recent work, Filippo Ferrari has argued that the normative nature of truth may vary across domains. My second aim is to extend this idea to logic, against the background of the idea that logic serves to underwrite instrumental (...) rationality. The third objective is to further develop Ferrari’s framework of normative alethic variability. I do so through a discussion of the normative problem of mixed compounds: the challenge of providing a principled account of the normativity of compounds with constituents whose respective normative profiles differ. I argue that the challenge can be met. Besides offering a solution to a major challenge, the response offered sheds new light on the normative variability framework: the truth of a single mixed compound may have different normative profiles across different ‘disagreement-realizers’. This feature of the view is rooted in a key commitment of the normative variability framework – namely, that disagreement and alethic normativity are intimately connected. (shrink)

According to ontological pluralism there are several ways of being. This is so if there is an unrestricted quantifier that ranges over everything there is, and there are several semantically primitive, restricted quantifiers with possible meanings such that each restricted quantifier has a non-empty domain that is properly included in the domain of the unrestricted quantifier, the domains of the restricted quantifiers do not overlap, and the meaning of each restricted quantifier is at least as natural as the meaning of (...) the unrestricted quantifier. My long-standing interest in the debate concerning pluralism about truth has shaped my choice of focus in this piece. According to truth pluralism there are several ways of being true. Different properties are relevant to the truth of propositions concerning different domains. The problem of mixed compounds challenges truth pluralists to provide a principled account of the truth of mixed compounds, i.e. compounds whose constituents are true in different ways. My aim here is to present and articulate a corresponding issue facing ontological pluralists: the problem of mixed beings. The problem of mixed beings challenges ontological pluralists to provide a principled account of the way in which mixed beings exist, i.e. beings whose constituents exist in different ways. (shrink)

Second-order axiomatizations of certain important mathematical theories—such as arithmetic and real analysis—can be shown to be categorical. Categoricity implies semantic completeness, and semantic completeness in turn implies determinacy of truth-value. Second-order axiomatizations are thus appealing to realists as they sometimes seem to offer support for the realist thesis that mathematical statements have determinate truth-values. The status of second-order logic is a controversial issue, however. Worries about ontological commitment have been influential in the debate. Recently, Vann McGee has argued that one (...) can get some of the technical advantages of second-order axiomatizations—categoricity, in particular—while walking free of worries about ontological commitment. In so arguing he appeals to the notion of an open-ended schema—a schema that holds no matter how the language of the relevant theory is extended. Contra McGee, we argue that second-order quantification and open-ended schemas are on a par when it comes to ontological commitment. (shrink)

Traditional theories of truth – such as the correspondence theory – are monist in character. All propositions, regardless of subject-matter, are true in the same way (if true). Recently, this view has been called into question by alethic pluralists (most notably Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch). According to the pluralist, the nature of truth varies across domains. Pluralists try to motivate their position by appealing to the following principle: for any domains D1 and D2, if the metaphysical constitutions of respectively (...) D1 and D2 differ, then D1-propositions and D2-propositions are true in different ways (if true). The aim of the paper isto present a monist challenge to this principle. The gist of the challenge is this: even if metaphysical pluralism (i.e. the antecedent) is granted, truth can be given a uniform account within a correspondence framework. The basic argument is this: every domain that the alethic pluralist is interested in is truth-apt. But any domain that deals in truth-apt propositions likewise deals in facts – after all, it seems a mere platitude that facts are what makes propositions true (if true). Once facts are admitted, the monist can argue as follows: a proposition is true if, and only if, it corresponds to reality. Now, a proposition corresponds to reality if, and only if, it represents reality correctly – and a proposition represents reality correctly if, and only if, what is says is a fact, or is the case. However, since the notion of fact is available for any truth-apt domain, a proposition – whatever its (truth-apt) domain – can be taken to be true if, and only if, it corresponds to reality. Thus, metaphysical pluralism does not imply alethic pluralism. (shrink)

According to moderate truth pluralism, truth is both One and Many. There is a single truth property that applies across all truth‐apt domains of discourse, but instances of this property are grounded in different ways. Propositions concerning medium‐sized dry goods might be true in virtue of corresponding with reality while propositions pertaining to the law might be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law. Moderate truth pluralists must answer two questions concerning logic: (Q1) Which logic governs inferences (...) concerning each truth‐apt domain considered separately? (Q2) Which logic governs inferences that involve several truth‐apt domains? This paper has three objectives. The first objective is to present and explain the moderate pluralist’s answers to (Q1) and (Q2). The second objective is to argue that there is a tension between these answers. The answer to (Q1) involves a commitment to a form of logical pluralism. However, reflection on the moderate truth pluralist’s answer to (Q2) shows that they are committed to taking logic to be topic neutrality. This, in turn, forces a commitment to logical monism. It would seem that the moderate truth pluralist cannot have it both ways. The third objective is constructive in nature. I offer an account of what moderate truth pluralists should say about logic and how they might resolve the tension in their view. I suggest that, just like moderate truth pluralists distinguish truth proper and “quasi‐truth,” they should endorse a distinction between logic proper and “quasi‐logic.” Quasi‐truth is truth‐like in the sense that instances of quasi‐truth ground instances of truth. Quasi‐logic is logic‐like in the sense that it concerns arguments that are necessarily truth‐preserving but are not generally so in a topic neutral way. I suggest that moderate truth pluralists should be monists about truth proper and logic proper but pluralists about quasi‐truth and quasi‐logic. This allows them to say that logic proper is topic neutral while still accommodating the idea that, for different domains, different arguments may be necessarily truth‐preserving. (shrink)

This paper summarizes the evolution of analytic philosophy in Taiwan, examines its impact within and beyond academia, and discusses the future of the discipline. The roots of modern philosophy in Taiwan can be traced back to the Japanese colonial era, and analytic philosophy was introduced to the country in the late 1940s when many intellectuals in China moved to Taiwan. However, massive curbs were imposed on philosophy during Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorship, and the discipline began to thrive again only after Taiwan’s (...) democratization in the late 1980s. Nonetheless, since its introduction in the colonial era, modern philosophy has made significant contributions in Taiwan, encouraging interdisciplinary engagements, advancing civic education, and promoting the spirit of democracy and political liberation. Philosophy has played a key role in Taiwan’s remarkable transformation from an island colonized for hundreds of years to a country that recognizes democracy, freedom, and human rights. The themes of anti-colonialism and anti-domination seen in the works of modern Taiwanese philosophers not only reflect the discipline’s political and historical underpinnings but also signal how Taiwanese philosophy can acquire a distinct identity despite being influenced by many other philosophical traditions. While still at a nascent stage, Taiwanese philosophy has the potential to join forces with other philosophical traditions in advancing the vision of decolonizing philosophy. (shrink)

The neo-Fregean account of arithmetical knowledge is centered around the abstraction principle known as Hume’s Principle: for any concepts X and Y , the number of X ’s is the same as the number of Y ’s just in case there is a 1–1 correspondence between X and Y . The Caesar Problem, originally raised by Frege in §56 of Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik , emerges in the context of the neo-Fregean programme, because, though Hume’s Principle provides a criterion of (...) identity for objects falling under the concept of Number–namely, 1–1 correspondence—the principle fails to deliver a criterion of application. That is, it fails to deliver a criterion that will tell us which objects fall under the concept Number, and so, leaves unanswered the question whether Caesar could be a number. Hale and Wright have recently offered a neo-Fregean solution to this problem. The solution appeals to the notion of a categorical sortal. This paper offers a reconstruction of their solution, which has the advantage over Hale and Wright’s original proposal of making clear what the structure of the background ontology is. In addition, it is shown that the Caesar Problem can be solved in a framework more minimal than that of Hale and Wright, viz . one that dispenses with categorical sortals. The paper ends by discussing an objection to the proposed neo-Fregean solutions, based on the idea that Leibniz’s Law gives a universal criterion of identity. This is an idea that Hale and Wright reject. However, it is shown that a solution very much in keeping with their own proposal is available, even if it is granted that Leibniz’s Law provides a universal criterion of identity. (shrink)

Thallium Sulphate is one of the most lethal chemicals known. Its commercial use has been banned in the West and in many Third World countries. However, it recently came to light that the Guyana Sugar Corporation was importing large amounts of the substance and that this has led to acute and chronic poisoning of many Guyanese. This paper examines this case and discusses its ethical implications.

Face recognition payment, an innovative financial technology service, is a recently developed mode of payment service that has garnered attention in the offline market, particularly in China. However, studies examining the adoption of FRP by consumers are scarce. Therefore, this study proposed a causal model built on the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology, and key predictors related to the intention of using FRP were identified. The structural equation model-based results obtained from 305 Chinese participants demonstrated that the (...) intention was most affected by relative advantage. In addition, performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, and perceived risk also had a significant impact. However, trust was found to not significantly affect consumers’ intentions, despite it negatively influencing perceived risk. Thus, the results of this study are expected to provide a set of guidelines for companies regarding the implementation of FRP. (shrink)

The objective of this study is to test the embeddedness of codes of ethics (ECE) in organizations on aggregated data from three countries, namely Australia, Canada and the United States. The properties of four constructs of ECE are described and tested, including surveillance/training, internal communication, external communication and guidance. The data analysis shows that the model has satisfactory fit, validity and reliability. Furthermore, the results are fairly consistent when tested on each of the three samples (i.e. cross-national validation). This cross-national (...) study makes a contribution beyond previous descriptive or exploratory studies by using confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling. Nevertheless, a number of limitations are raised, all of which provide opportunities for further research in refining, extending and testing the proposed ECE model in other cultural and corporate settings. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to examine the ‘Code of Ethics Quality’ (CEQ) in the largest companies of Australia, Canada and the United States. For this purpose, a proposed CEQ construct has been applied. It appears from the empirical findings that while Australia, Canada and the United States are extremely similar in their economic and social development, there may well be distinct cultural mores and issues that are forming their business ethics practices. A research implication derived from the performed (...) research is that the construct provides a selection of observable and measurable elements in the context of CEQ. The construct of CEQ consists of nine measures divided into two dimensions (i.e. staff support and regulation). They should not be seen as a complete list. On the contrary, it is encouraged that others propose and elaborate revisions and extensions. A practical implication of this paper is a structure of what and how to examine the CEQ in a managerial setting. It may assist companies in their efforts to establish, maintain and improve their ethical culture, norms and beliefs within the organization and supporting them in their ethical business practices with different stakeholders in the marketplace and society. The dimensions and measures of the construct may be used as a frame of reference for further research. They may be useful and applicable across contexts and over time using similar samples when it comes to large companies, as small‐ or medium‐sized ones may not have considered all areas nor have the elements in place. This is a research limitation, but it provides an opportunity for further research. (shrink)

Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people’s private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on what precisely a formal and social epistemological account of pluralistic ignorance should look like, we need answers to at least the following two questions: What exactly is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance? And can the phenomenon arise among perfectly rational agents? In (...) this paper, we propose answers to both these questions. First, we characterize different versions of pluralistic ignorance and define the version that we claim most adequately captures the examples cited as paradigmatic cases of pluralistic ignorance in the literature. In doing so, we will stress certain key epistemic and social interactive aspects of the phenomenon. Second, given our characterization of pluralistic ignorance, we argue that the phenomenon can indeed arise in groups of perfectly rational agents. This, in turn, ensures that the tools of formal epistemology can be fully utilized to reason about pluralistic ignorance. (shrink)

The status of the geodesic principle in General Relativity has been a topic of some interest in the recent literature on the foundations of spacetime theories. Part of this discussion has focused on the role that a certain energy condition plays in the proof of a theorem due to Bob Geroch and Pong-Soo Jang [“Motion of a Body in General Relativity.” Journal of Mathematical Physics16(1) (1975)] that can be taken to make precise the claim that the geodesic principle is (...) a theorem, rather than a postulate, of General Relativity. In this brief note, I show, by explicit counterexample, that not only is a weaker energy condition than the one Geroch and Jang state insufficient to prove the theorem, but in fact a condition still stronger than the one that they assume is necessary. (shrink)

A theorem due to Bob Geroch and Pong Soo Jang [“Motion of a Body in General Relativity.” Journal of Mathematical Physics 16, ] provides the sense in which the geodesic principle has the status of a theorem in General Relativity. Here we show that a similar theorem holds in the context of geometrized Newtonian gravitation. It follows that in Newtonian gravitation, as in GR, inertial motion can be derived from other central principles of the theory.

A theorem due to Bob Geroch and Pong Soo Jang ["Motion of a Body in General Relativity." Journal of Mathematical Physics 16, ] provides a sense in which the geodesic principle has the status of a theorem in General Relativity. I have recently shown that a similar theorem holds in the context of geometrized Newtonian gravitation [Weatherall, J. O. "The Motion of a Body in Newtonian Theories." Journal of Mathematical Physics 52, ]. Here I compare the interpretations of these (...) two theorems. I argue that despite some apparent differences between the theorems, the status of the geodesic principle in geometrized Newtonian gravitation is, mutatis mutandis, strikingly similar to the relativistic case. (shrink)

This paper compares the findings of content analyses of the corporate codes of ethics of Canada's largest corporations in 1992 and 2003. For both years, a modified version of a technique used in several other studies was used to determine and categorize the contents of the codes. It was found, inter alia, that, in 2003, as in 1992, more of the codes were concerned with conduct against the firm than with conduct on behalf of the firm. Among the changes from (...) 1992 to 2003 were a significant increase in the frequency of mention of environmental affairs, legal responsibility as the basis of codes and enforcement/compliance procedures. (shrink)

4.5 Initiation Language in Philo's Secondary Mode of Exegesis -- 4.5.1 Excursus: Philo and Enoch Traditions -- 4.5.2 De gigantibus 50-55 -- 4.5.3 A Mixed Economy: Active and Passive Attitudes of Mind -- 4.5.4 Proximate Jewish Perspectives -- 4.6 Conclusion -- Chapter 5: Scriptural Exegesis and the Language of Divine Inspiration in the Allegorical Commentary -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.1.1 Chapter Preview -- 5.2 Approaches to Divine Inspiration in Antiquity -- 5.2.1 Perspectives on Divine Inspiration in Plato -- 5.2.2 Perspectives (...) on Divine Inspiration in Aristotle -- 5.2.3 Other First-Century, Non-Jewish Perspectives on Divine Inspiration -- 5.2.4 Ancient Jewish and Early Christian Perspectives on Divine Inspiration -- 5.3 Divine Inspiration in Philo's Writings -- 5.3.1 Divine Inspiration in Philo's Non-Allegorical Writings -- 5.3.2 Divine Inspiration in Philo's Allegorical Writings -- 5.4 Exegetical Foci in Philo's Approach to Divine Inspiration -- 5.4.1 The 'Lesser' and 'Greater' Mysteries of Moses: Sacr. 59-62 -- 5.4.2 Philo, Exodus and Divine Inspiration -- 5.5 Genesis in Philo's Language of Divine Inspiration -- 5.5.1 Platonic Perspectives on Non-Rational Divine Inspiration -- 5.5.2 Ecstasy and Prophecy as Allied Phenomena -- 5.5.3 Divine Inspiration and the 'Greater Mysteries' of Moses -- 5.5.4 The Self-Taught Nature and Ecstatic Inspiration -- 5.5.5 Homeric Portrayals of Self-Taught Inspiration -- 5.6 Conclusion -- Chapter 6: Conclusion -- 6.1 A Central Clue to Philo's Theological Epistemologies -- 6.1.1 General Summary -- 6.1.2 Areas of Overlap Between the Two Epistemologies -- 6.1.3 The Epistemological Significance of Initiation Language -- 6.1.4 The Epistemological Significance Divine Inspiration Language -- 6.2 Evaluation -- 6.3 Avenues for Further Research. (shrink)

This edited volume brings together 18 state-of-the art essays on pluralism about truth and logic. Parts I and II are dedicated to respectively truth pluralism and logical pluralism, and Part III to their interconnections. Some contributors challenge pluralism, arguing that the nature of truth or logic is uniform. The majority of contributors, however, defend pluralism, articulate novel versions of the view, or contribute to fundamental debates internal to the pluralist camp. The volume will be of interest to truth theorists and (...) philosophers of logic, as well as philosophers interested in relativism, contextualism, metaphysics, philosophy of language, semantics, paradox, epistemology, or normativity. (shrink)